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Abstract. The perspective directions of rent-seeking phenomenon research are 
allocated in the article. The algorithm of rent-seeking system research is offered. rent-
focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies are differenced in the text. The special 
attention is paid to definition of medium-term and long-term rent-seeking effects 
directed to assignment of natural-resources rent on example of national economic 
systems of the UAE and Nauru. 
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Studies of the rent-seeking phenomenon are interesting to many authors in the 
world almost 50 years, and it is over the past two decades for national science 
representatives. In my opinion, it can be explained by the following reasons: 
1) Studies of rent-seeking are integral part of comprehensive rent relations 
system analysis; 
2) Prevalence of rent-seeking behavior in the so-called “rent economies”, 
which is accepted to the national economies of many countries, including Russia; 
3) Continuing validity to develop more accurate methods of estimating losses 
as the results of rent-seeking (the term “rent-seeking” had negative connotation for 
the results of economic activity at the macro level originally); 
4) Necessity to define such interrelated areas, methods, tools of economic 
policies, which are essential to be rent-seeking behavior of economic and political 
agents and its negative impact to national economies development processes. 
These reasons indicate that a detailed studies of the rent-seeking nature, forms, 
consequences have practical importance also, not only theoretical importance. And 
the problems associated with rent-seeking behavior have long been acquired 
economical, political, environmental, and general social sound. In this regard, there 
can be no doubt that the study of the rent-seeking behavior phenomenon should be 
interdisciplinary, gathering together economists, psychologists, sociologists and 
political scientists initially. 
On the one side, review of the available scientific literature about rent-seeking 
behavior moves us to the conclusion that serious advancement of research in this 
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direction takes place. Solid theoretical and methodological foundation has been 
established for the rent-seeking phenomenon study: “political economy of rent-
seeking society” was established [9]; “theory of rent-seeking society” is forming [3, 
10]; the theory of rent-seeking and the property rights theory are integrated [24]; the 
basic models of rent-seeking behavior are built [11, 22]; the models of political 
agents rent-seeking behavior in the political business cycles context are constructed 
[1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 12-15, 20, 23]. Also many local aspects of rent-seeking in different 
countries including Russia are considered [16-19, 21, 25]. 
On the other side, there are some questions, the lack of answers to which limits 
the further development not only the theory of rent-seeking behavior, but also the rent 
relations theory in general. In my opinion, these questions can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. As far as the estimate of rent-seeking behavior as clearly negative 
phenomenon at the national economies is correct? If this estimation isn’t correct, the 
rents must be differentiated as “effective” and “ineffective”, “productive” and “non-
productive”. 
2. The need for differentiation of the above necessarily entails the question: as 
far as the current classification of rents is correct for the current stage of economic 
systems development at the different levels? 
3. If we try to divide “effective” and “ineffective” rents, we should to identify 
clearly criterion of effectiveness / ineffectiveness of rents and rent-seeking. 
4. Does the period term influence to level of rent and rent-seeking effectiveness 
/ ineffectiveness? If that’s right, we should distinguish the rent-seeking behavior 
influence to the economic system at the short-, medium- and long-term periods. 
5. In this case, what is the criterion for short-, medium- and long-term periods 
distinguishing for rent-seeking behavior? Will this criterion be the same for any kind 
of rent? 
6. What are definitions for “effective/ineffective” and “productive/non-
productive” rent-seeking? 
7. Is it possible to construct comprehensive methodology for assessing the 
losses for society (or the growth of social welfare) determined by rent-seeking 
behavior? 
8. How can we calculate the summa of rental incomes and their share in the 
national income? 
9. What possibilities do we have for further analysis of rent-seeking behavior 
at different levels of socio-economic system? 
This isn’t exhaustive list of questions which shows promising directions of 
development of rent relations theory in general, and theory of rent-seeking behavior 
in particular, on the one hand. Currently we can not answer this complex question 
reasonably. But we have opportunity to nominate some hypotheses that need to 
confirm (or to refute) during further research. 
First, there is reason to believe that rent-seeking have negative characteristics 
in terms of its impact to the national economy not always. J. Buchanan differentiated 
rent-seeking and profit-seeking and he gave negative attitude to rent-seeking 
substantiate only [3]. But such distinction has been determinate by trap created during 
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synthesis of classical, neoclassical and institutional approaches to the rent relations 
theory. Excess profits can be identified as part of economic agents’ profits, and some 
neoclassical economists called excess profits as rental incomes which should be 
called “innovative and technological quasi-rents”. Seeking of such quasi-rents is 
positive because it contributes to the economic system development. Therefore, 
assessment of rent-seeking behavior as clearly negative phenomenon isn’t correct. 
That’s why we should differentiate “effective” and “ineffective” rents and 
“productive” and “non-productive” rents also. 
Second, I venture to suggest that current rents classification isn’t quite perfect 
for modern economic systems development. Actually, single universally accepted 
rents classification is out. Some years ago the author proposed the following typology 
of rental incomes (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Rents typology based on the rental resource criterion 
 
Economic Rents 
Natural-resource 
Rents 
Land rents  
 
- agricultural rent; 
- forest rent; 
- water rent; 
- touristic rent 
Mounting rents 
- oil rent; 
- gas rent; 
- mineral rent 
Economic  
quasi-Rents 
- intellectual rent; 
- informational rent; 
- innovative and technological rent; 
- price rent; 
- financial rent; 
- managerial and organization rent 
Non-Economic Rents  
Non-Economic quasi-
Rents 
- political quasi-rent; 
- status-administrative quasi-rent 
 
There is diversity of opinions about species “non-economic rents” distinction 
in modern literature. Furthermore, I see controversial character of proposed typology 
of land rents. Therefore, “effective” and “ineffective” rents differentiation such as 
“productive” and “non-productive” rents differentiation require prior improving of 
rents classification. 
Third, I should tell that clear criteria for rents (and rent-seeking) 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness has not been developed yet. Existing criterion (rent-
seeking leads to increase vs decrease of social welfare / GDP / national income, etc.) 
is very “fuzzy”, and vague and therefore imperfect. That’s why clear criteria (may be 
criteria system) evaluation of rent-seeking effectiveness / ineffectiveness defining is 
one of the most important problems in modern economic science. 
Fourth, it is possible to assume that level of rent (rent-seeking) effectiveness / 
ineffectiveness depends from the length of period under review. So-called “Dutch 
disease” is one of examples: natural resource rent-seeking can lead to social welfare 
increase, but investment activity is reducing at other activities. During subsequent 
periods, social welfare can be reduced due to non-renewable resources exhaustion or 
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due to global market conditions changes. Therefore, it’s necessary to distinguish 
short-, medium- and long-term influences of rent-seeking behavior to the economic 
systems. 
Fifth, criteria system for differentiation of short-, medium- and long-term 
periods in relation to rent-seeking behavior isn’t developed yet. Political business 
cycle and legislature durations are source parameters for political quasi-rent seeking, 
but this criterion isn’t so clear for other rent types. It can be assumed that 
demarcation periods criterion is closely linked to relevant rental resources 
characteristics. However, it is unlikely that it will be universal criterion. 
Sixth, we assume that “productive” rent-seeking can be as “effective” as 
“ineffective” depending from review period term. However, this hypothesis needs to 
be elaborated argumentation. 
Seventh, it seems likely that comprehensive methodology construction for 
social welfare losses assessing (or for social welfare growth) from rent-seeking 
behavior is possible in principle if the total amount of rental incomes and their share 
in the national income are determined more or less accurately. We shouldn’t forget 
that A. Krueger in the 1970s held theoretical analysis and assessment of rent that 
arose in connection with the practice of state power limit for economic activity in 
India and in Turkey [9]. 
Eighth, there are various methods for rental incomes value and their share of 
national income determining already. However, techniques proposed by D.S. Lvov, 
S.Y. Glazyev and other Russian scientists are not perfect. D.S. Lvov believed that 
“problem of distinguishing the rental component of income is unlikely to have a 
standard solution suitable for all cases of industrial activity which involves natural 
resources” [18]. 
Ninth, Center for Psychological and Economic Researches at Saratov Scientific 
Center RAS formulated hypothesis to separate two categories: rent-focused behavior 
and rent-seeking. Original “rent seeking” term was formulated to describe economic 
agents’ behavior in institutional transformation context when individual efforts to 
maximize value generate society losses, rather benefits. We assume that actual rent-
focused behavior is characterized by agents’ actions aimed to rental incomes 
assignment based on economic using of existing rental resources. In contrast, rent-
seeking is characterized primarily by agents’ actions to create rental resources in the 
socio-economic system to use for rent incomes extraction in the future. Obviously, 
rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking involve each other in the same socio-
economic system. 
Based on the above, following outline for study of rent-seeking behavior (see 
Fig. 1). 
Let’s dwell on parameters for rent-seeking and rent-seeking behavior 
differentiation and on influence to national economies development by these two 
behavioral strategies. As initial object natural resource rents have particular 
importance for national socio-economic system functioning and development. 
Natural resource rent-seeking and rent-focused behavior strategies 
implementation effects can be seen on example of many countries. We choose two 
countries: Republic of Nauru and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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Fig. 1. Rent-seeking behavior study design 
 
On the other side, these states are very different. The UAE belongs to the small 
states category (the total population is 8.45 million people in 2013); and Nauru is 
microstate, its population is about 10 thousands people on small territory (just 21.3 
km²). United Arab Emirates is the landlocked country bordering Persian Gulf; Nauru 
is remote Pacific Ocean island nation near equator. Primary rental resources of the 
UAE are crude oil originally and natural gas also. The main rental resource of Nauru 
is phosphates. The list of differences can be expanded significantly. 
On the other side, selected states have much in common. 
1. The financial basis for development of these state entities had been the 
natural resource rent (oil and gas rents for the UAE, and phosphate rent for Nauru). 
Rents typology on criterion Х 
Rent 1 Rent 2 Rent 3 …….. Rent N 
Determining methodic  расчета rental income 
Effective  
rent-seeking 
Methodic creation and calculation 
of  benefits/losses for social welfare  
Effective rent 
Identification of methods and tools for 
rent-seeking behavior stimulation 
Rental income value calculation  
Ineffective rent 
Rent effectiveness criterion determining 
 
Ineffective  
rent-seeking 
Identification of methods and tools for 
rent-seeking behavior limitation 
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2. The states put under strict control creation, distribution and use of natural 
resource rents both in order to ensure the financial basis of development: Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company was established in 1971, and Nauru Phosphate Corporation 
established also. 
3. Both countries had a long history of development as colonial possessions. 
They were unable to determine the socio-economic development strategy before 
political independence gaining. Therefore, the positive effects of rent-seeking 
behavior could not be high in these countries during the colonial period (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Rental economies parameters in Nauru and in the UAE 
before political independence gaining. 
 
Terri-
tory 
Traditional 
industries 
The opening 
of the rental 
resource  
Start of the 
rental resource 
intensive 
exploitation  
Subjects 
assignment of 
rental income 
The effects of rent-
seeking behavior 
Nauru 
Fishing, 
gathering, 
agriculture 
1900 1906 
Non-residents 
(Australian 
and British 
companies) 
Full employment 
achieving; some 
growth in living 
standards 
UAE 
Oasis farming, 
fishing, 
pearling, 
nomadic 
herding 
1954 1959 
Non-residents 
(British 
companies) 
Full employment 
achieving; some 
growth in living 
standards 
 
4. The countries received the political independence at the same time. 
5. Labor shortage has led to significant influx of foreign labor force (from 
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Philippines to the UAE; from 
Kiribati and Tuvalu to Nauru), which affected strongly to the population composition 
in both countries. Indigenous population is about 11% in the UAE, and it doesn’t 
exceed 58% of the total population in Nauru. 
Political and economic independence achievement of political and economic 
independence allowed to fix the natural resource rents as base of national 
development. The political leaderships of the states demonstrated pronounced rent-
oriented behavior (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Baseline characteristics of Nauru and the UAE rental economies. 
 
The 
state 
Independen
ce founding 
The base of 
national economy 
The dominant 
rental resource  
The source of 
rental incomes 
The subject of 
assignment of 
rents 
UAE 1971 
natural resource 
rent (crude oil rent) 
crude oil and 
natural gas 
Labor of  hired 
workers-
immigrants   
The state 
Nauru 1968 
natural resource 
rent (phosphate 
rent) 
phosphates 
(“nauruits”) 
Labor of  hired 
workers-
immigrants   
The state 
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During the first decades of the state sovereignty Nauru and the UAE have 
shown the effects natural resource rent-seeking behavior, which can be reduced to the 
following parameters: a) significant increase in the standard of living of the 
population (mostly it affected indigenous people); b) high values of GDP, GNP, 
national income, including per capita (in Nauru in 1986, per capita GDP reached $ 
20,000, it was close to the rate in the United Arab Emirates); c) the increase in the 
positive balance of foreign trade (the ratio of export and import in Nauru in the mid-
1980s. 4: 1); d) the rapid growth of value of the assets; e) the rapid development of 
social infrastructure, including education and health systems; f) positive trends of the 
population (at the time of independence in 1968, the population of Nauru was about 3 
000 residents, after 30 years of independence it was about 10 000 residents, that in 
the UAE this indicator increased from 180 000 in 1971 to nearly 3 million in 1999). 
Thus, for at least two decades after gaining political independence and the 
nationalization of the main rental resource indicators of the economies of both 
countries (“rental economies”) have the same motion vector. An analysis of longer 
period of national economic systems functioning opens up a completely different 
picture (see Tab. 4). 
 
Table 4. Long-term economical-ecological effects of natural-resource rent-seeking behavior  
in Nauru and in the UAE 
 
The 
state 
Nominal 
GDP per 
capita  
Ecological 
system  
Rental 
resource 
Rental incomes 
dynamics 
The economic result  of 
natural resource rent-
seeking behavior 
Nauru 
5000 $  in 
2005; 2500 
$ in 2006  
Practically 
destroyed 
Practically 
exhausted 
Steadily declining 
The collapse of 
economic system 
 
UAE 
64840 $ in 
2012 
Artificiall
y created 
While 
maintaining 
the same 
found new 
Reducing the share 
of oil and gas rents, 
increase in the 
share of new types 
of rental incomes 
Diversification of the 
economy and its 
sustainable 
development 
 
Economic shifts determined relevant socio-political events in the two countries 
(see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Long-term socio-political effects of natural-resource rent-seeking behavior  
in Nauru and in the UAE 
 
The state The population dynamics Unemployment rate  Political system 
Nauru 
The population decline during 10 years 
almost 10% (to 9 300 in 2012) 
90% in 2004 Unstable 
UAE 
The population decline during 10 years 
almost three times (to 8 264 thousands in 
2010)  
4,6% in 2012 Stable 
 
On the one hand, it is necessary to take into account that the operation of the 
main rental resource in the UAE started about half a century later than in Nauru. On 
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the other hand, it is even more important to consider the institutional features of the 
political elite rent-seeking behavior in Nauru and in United Arab Emirates. Adequate 
institutional options for creating, appropriation and distribution of natural resource 
rents are necessary conditions for output of the national economy on the path of 
sustainable development. Sufficient conditions for such development are adequate 
institutions for rental incomes using. In Nauru natural resource rent has been used to 
improve living standards in the medium term (it directed at expanding the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the rental economy), as well as for the foreign 
assets acquisition (real estate mainly). In the UAE natural resource rents became the 
strong financial foundation for the national economy diversification and for the new 
rental resources search and for subsequent assignment of rental income types 
(financial, tourist, and technological innovation rents). 
It seems that the most important factor of national economic systems vectors 
divergence in two states was the specifics of the implementation of the rent-focused 
behavior and rent-seeking strategies, as well as their combination. 
Initially, the rent-focused behavior strategy in the UAE included maximizing 
the volume of production and export of energy sources such as oil and natural gas 
(reduction of oil production in the early 1980s was due to external institutional 
constraints like entry into OPEC), as evidenced by the data of Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Natural-material parameters of the rent-focused behavior strategy implementation  
in the UAE 
 
Rent-focused activities 
Years 
1977 1985 2006 2010 
Oil extraction, million tons 96,6 60,1 145,4 > 141,0 
Gas extraction, billion m³ not available 9,3 47,0 (in 2005) 48,8 (in 2009) 
 
Promising prospects for the rent-focused behavior strategy continuation have 
not prevented the country's leaders to start rent-seeking strategy implementing in the 
1980s (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies synthesis in the UAE 
 
Strategies 
Forms of strategies 
implementation  
Rental incomes 
type 
Socio-economic 
effects at the 
beginning of the 
XXI century 
Economic 
prospects in the 
XXI century 
Rent-focused 
behavior 
Oil and gas 
extraction and 
exports 
Natural resource 
rent 
Positive Negative dynamics 
Rent-seeking 
Free economic zones 
creation (since 1985) 
Innovative 
technological 
quasi-rent 
Positive Positive dynamics 
Creation of an 
international 
financial center 
Financial quasi-
rent  
Positive (up to 
$10 billion, and 
to 40 tons of gold 
per year) 
Positive dynamics 
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Creation and 
development of 
transit transport 
infrastructure  
Price (re-export) 
quasi-rent 
Positive 
Positive dynamics 
The development of 
touristic 
infrastructure 
“Touristic rent” 
Positive ($20 
billion = 6,1% 
GDP) 
Positive dynamics 
The development of 
nuclear energy (since 
2008) 
Innovative 
technological 
quasi-rent 
No (before 2017) 
Take place (to 2020 
about 25% total 
electricity 
production) 
 
The skillful combination of two strategies led to significant shifts in the 
national economy structure (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Structure-economic effect of the rent-seeking strategy in the UAE 
 
Years 1982 1991 2010 
The share of the oil and gas industry in the 
UAE GDP, % 
50 43 25 
 
Statistical and empirical evidences indicate that the positive effect of the rent-
focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies synthetic implementation in the UAE 
socio-economic system (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Effect of the rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies synthetic 
implementation in the UAE socio-economic system 
 
Table 9. Natural-material parameters of the rent-focused behavior strategy implementation  
in Nauru 
 
Rent-focused activity  Years 
1985 1995 2001 2003 
Phosphates extraction and 
exports, million tons 
1,67 2 0,162 0 
 
Consistent implementation of the rent-seeking behavior strategy in Nauru to 
the twentieth century beginning led to the main rental resource depletion (see Table 
 
Rent-focused 
behavior 
 
Rent-focused behavior + 
Rent-seeking 
 
Life quality 
improving  
The growth of 
absolute 
indicators of 
consumption and 
savings 
 
Life quality 
improving  
 
? 
The growth of 
absolute 
indicators of 
consumption 
and savings 
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9). Mining phosphate resumption in 2006 coincided with change in the subject of 
natural resource rents appropriation (from the state to Australian company “Incitex 
Pivot”). 
In contrast to the UAE, natural resource rent in Nauru didn’t become the 
financial basis of the rent-seeking strategy. Another negative factor was the almost 
complete destruction of the unique island nature, which rule out the possibility of the 
tourism cluster development. Consequently, the rent-seeking strategy implementation 
faced serious constraints that influenced the choice of rent-seeking directions (see 
Table 10). 
 
Table 10. Features of the rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies in Nauru 
 
Strategies 
Forms of strategies 
implementation  
Rental 
incomes type 
Socio-economic 
effects at the 
beginning of the 
XXI century 
Economic 
prospects in the 
XXI century 
Rent-focused 
behavior 
Phosphates extraction and 
exports 
Natural 
resource rent 
Negative No 
Rent-seeking 
Creating an offshore zone 
(before 2003) 
Financial 
quasi-rent 
Negative No 
Sale of passports to 
foreigners (“investor 
passports”) 
Status quasi-
rent 
No No 
Licenses issuance for 
fishing 
Natural 
resource rent 
Ambivalent Negligible 
Placement of immigrants 
on their way to Australia 
Geopolitical 
quasi-rent by 
location 
Ambivalent Negligible 
 
The above predetermined points other than in the UAE effect of the rent-
focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies implementation (see Fig. 3). In this 
regard, the prospects for Nauru national economic system development remain 
uncertain. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The effect of phased implementation of rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking 
strategies in Nauru socio-economic system. 
 
 
Rent-focused 
behavior 
 
Rent-seeking 
 
Life quality 
improving  
 
 
Life quality 
decline 
 
Life quality 
decline 
 
 
? 
 
? 
 
Rent-focused 
behavior 
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Comparison of the parameters times and economic effects of rent-seeking and 
rent-focused behavior shows for us the lateness of the rent-seeking strategy in Nauru. 
The time limit of natural resource rent-focused behavior strategy implementation was 
detected no later than mid-1980s, and implementation of the rent-seeking strategy 
started (even in its inefficient version) more than after 10 years (see Fig. 4). In the 
UAE, in addition to the objective of favorable factors, the positive role played by 
early country’s leaders decision to start the multidirectional rent-seeking strategy 
implementing (see Fig. 5). 
 
The economic effect of strategies 
 
1985     1995   2001 2003  2006      t 
 
Fig. 4. Implementation of the of rent-focused behavior (red) and rent-seeking (green) 
strategies in Nauru. 
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1977   1985       2006  2010  t 
Fig. 5. Implementation of the of rent-focused behavior (red) and rent-seeking (green) 
strategies in the UAE. 
 
Summary: 
1. Differentiation of rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking defines one of the 
directions of comprehensive rent relations theory further development at the 
intersection of economics, psychology, sociology, political science and international 
relations. 
2. The practical importance is determined by productivity of the rent-focused 
behavior and rent-seeking strategies comparing in terms of the influence of their 
implementation parameters to the socio-economic systems development trajectory. 
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